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This study seeks to analyze the role of oil in Saudi Arabia's
foreign policy .

In 1973 Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations success-

fully used their oil resources to apply pressure on the United States
of America to modify her strong support of the State of Israel.
Arabia played a significant role in the 1973 oil embargo .

Saudi

This thesis

will examine Saudi Arabia's role in the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo, and
what prompted her participation, considering the fact that she is less
radical than most of her Arab neighbors.

The 1973 oil embargo was

more successful than for example the 1967 embargo; Saudi Arabia's participation helped to create this difference.

The oil weapon will defi-

nitely be effective whenever applied uniformly by the Arabs against the
west, especially now, and possibly in the near future.

However, it will

be unwise for the Arabs to continuously depend on the oil weapon since
their oil resources cannot last forever.

As Dr. Sheikh Rustum Ali sta-

ted in his book entitled Saudi Arabia and Oil Diploma~y, alternative
energy resources are still abundant.

The western hemisphere or indus-

trialized nations need only to apply their financial resources and technology to develop these resources .

It obviously won't be an easy task

for them to do so, now or in the near future, however it could be done.
When this becomes a reality, the demand for oil will be sharply reduced,
which will in turn deprive it of its present significance and of its
role as a political weapon in international affairs.
This study will examine the alternative sources of energy being
developed in the west, notably nuclear energy.

Nuclear energy plants

are rapidly being built in the western industrialized nations despite
some oppositions by citizen groups within. these various nations.

There

2

is evidence that these projects are favourable to some oil producing nations, including Saudi Arabia .

Efficient use of energy is currently an

important issue among the industrialized as well as the non-industrialized nations.

The interest for alternative sources of energy is grow-

ing, partially due to higher oil prices.

The high price of oil is forc-

ing the United States for example ( a victim of the 1973 Arab oil embargo) to rapidly seek alternative as well as new sources of energy.
Solar energy is another alternative source of energy being developed.

This along with nuclear energy could be significant alterna-

tives to oil successfully developed.
The major propositions that will be supported in this thesis
are:

Saudi Arabia fully supported the 1973 oil embargo, (1) to show

her support of the muslim Arab nations, thus promoting unity among them;
(2) to show her fear of Israel's ideological stand, which she considers
too extreme, and radical; (3) to have Israel withdraw from Arab lands
occupied during the 196.7 war; (4) to gain respect and recognition from
the western industrialized nations; (5) to take up a leadership role
among the Arab nations in the Middle East, since her participation was
crucial to the success of the embargo.
known oil reserves in the world.

Saudi Arabia has the largest
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

CONTEMPORARY SAUDI ARABIA: A BRIEF OVERVIEW
A brief mention of the geography, history and government of
Saudi Arabia will be included in the introduction of this thesis , in
order to give the reader some background information regarding Saudi
Arabia.

Un til recently, very little work has been done regarding this

desert kingdom.

It owes its sudden thrust into international politics

to its vast oil wealth.

It is the hope of the author that the brief over -

view given in this chapter will aid the reader in understanding the
various topics that will be discussed in this thesis.

Geography
Saudi Arabia covers over four - fifths of the Arabian Penninsula,
which is approximately three times the siee of the state of Texas.
Saudi Arabia is well known today because of its vast oil wealth.

The

world's largest known oil resources are found in this desert kingdom.
Its vast oil resour ces and conservative political orientation· makes her
unique in the Middle Eas t , and at the same time a friend to the West,
Saudi Arabia borders the Red Sea and shares borders with

I'
I
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Jordan , Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, The United Arab Emirates,
The Yemen Arab Republic, The People's Democratic Republic of
Yemen and Oman.

Across the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia are Egypt ,

The Sudan and Ethiopia .

Most important of all, it faces the Israeli-

occupied Sinai Peninsula, across the Gulf of Aqaba.
source of water falls within the 1, 560 - mile coastline.

Its only major
Water from the

coastline serves irrigation purposes for the limited arable land.
There are five major regions.

Along the coast of the Red Sea

are located the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and also the diplo matic capital of Jeddah.

These cities are located in the Hijaz region.

The A sir region which is mountainous lies to the South along the Red
Sea.

Najd occupies the central part of the country where the capital,

Riyadh is located.

The Eastern region, also known as Al - Hasa, is the

site of the country's rich oil fields .

The Trans-Arabian pipeline crosses

the fifth region which is the Northern region.

This pipeline also crosses

Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, leading to the Mediterranean Sea. 1

People
Saudis were predominately nomadic or semi- nomadic.

How -

ever oil wealth has characteristically changed this pattern of lifestyle
for most Saudis.

The official language is Arabic, and the majority of

Saudis are Muslims, who practice the puritanica l Wahhabi interpretation of Sunni Islam.

There are no Jews in Saudi Arabia, and Christians

are not permitted in the holy cities .

Americans, Eur opeans, and

3

Christians from other Arab countries are employed in the oil industry.

Government
Prior to the establishment of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
there was constant struggle for political power between the Bedouin
tribes.

Their constant struggles to control the country continued to

the detriment of the peninsula.

Tribes alternately supported each

other when a strong leadership emerged.

2

During the early part of the eighteenth century, Sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab, described as a religious Imam initiated a reform movement in Arabia.

The Najd province became his home and

consequently the home of Wahhabism (the puritanical interpretation of
Sunni Islam).

The ruler of Najd was later expelled by the rival clan

of Rashids from Najd to Kuwait.

The exiled ruler's son, Abdul Aziz

Ibn Saud, known to the west as Ibn Saud, reconquered Riyadh, which
was the capital 9£ Najd in 1901.

When Ibn Saud returned to Riyadh

from exile in Kuwait, he brought along some followers who adhered to
the Wahhabi sect of Islam.
year Medina was also taken .

In 1924 Mecca was taken and the following
Ibn Saud was made king of Hejaz in 1926,

and in 1932 the different portions of Arabia were joined into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

The pre sent kingdom has been independent since

it was founded in the early twentieth century.

3

Since its establishment, Saudi Arabia's political structure
changed from primitive tribal-religious patriarchy into an absolute

4

monarchy, with the king's power limited only by islamic law.
The laws of Islam provide the country with civic and penal
codes and also regulate religious problems . Religious law
is the source of all legislation. But the king has the power
to issue a decree where religious law is not applicable. The
Koran is the supreme law of the kingdom . The Shariah, which
is the foundation of the judicial system, is based on the Koran
and the Sunnah (custom, law, exemplary life) of the prophet
Muhammad. The judiciary is an independent agency in the
state . The qua.dis (judges) usually judge according to the
Hanbalite version of the Shariah Law. Punishment for murder
is decapitation by the sword. Justice, when not theoretically
in conflict with the Shariah, can also be governed by tribal and
customary laws. 4
The Saudi Arabian government is based on a tribal system and
the king is both the source of political power and head figure of the
central government.

The dual role of state and religious leader rests

on the king, and he manages the administration through the royal
court, tribal sheiks, the Council of Ministers and the regional and local
emirs .

However the final authority in all executive and legislative

matters rests on the king though consultation on all levels of govern ment occurs.

Prior to 1932, King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud conducted

everything alone, but after the administration of the country went be yond the power of a single person, changes were made.
grew rapidly because new territories were added to it.

The kingdom
Prince Saud

became leader of the kingdom when his father Ibn Saud died in 1953.
Issues such as taxation and border control particularly were introduced
through government decrees by Prince Saud, and they fall within the
framework of the Koran and the Sha riah.

5

A Council of Ministers was added to the traditional structure of
the Saudi Arabian central government.

This Council is responsible

for the budget and also supervises several government affairs.
described as the "supreme authority" under the king.

It is

Regulations,

treaties, international agreements and concessions are never decreed
by the king unless they have been prepared by and meet the approval of
the Council of Ministers. 5
The history of the kingdom since 1953 to the present is charac•

terized by several trends.
cal crisis with Egypt.

In 1958 the kingdom was involved in a politi-

Issues like the Palestinian question and the

settlement of several border disputes were notable events.

Among

these trends is Saudi Arabia's leading role in the formation of OPEC
{Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) in 1960.

On the

domestic front, Saudi Arabia was mainly concerned with building a
strong economy and the continued integration of the various functions
within the population.

In 1958, Crown Prince Faisal was appointed

Prime Minister, thus taking charge of governmental affairs.

Two

years later, King Saud, Prince Faisal's brother reas sumed full control
of governmental affairs from Prince Faisal.
within the royal family.

This created a struggle

On November .5, 1964, King Saud was forced

to abdicate, left Faisal lbn Abdul-Aziz Abdul-Rahman Al Faisal as king
and ruler of Saudi Arabia.

Faisal was described from the beginning as a strong and able

6
administrator.

Faisal followed King Abd al-Aziz 1 s policies in respect

to the Palestinian question.

The old king, Abd Al-Aziz had argued that

Palestine was an Arab state and that the Israelis had no right to take
the land.

He felt that the European Jews who had suffered so badly

from Nazi extermination policies should return to their country of
origin, because the Allied victory had removed the ~azi threat to their
existence.

From his point of view, the Jewish question was a Euro-

pean problem, and that the sins of the Europeans should not be expiated
at the expense of the Arabs. 7

Like his predeceesor, King Faisal also

viewed the Israelis as intruders.

To force Israel to withdraw from all

Arab occupied territories, Faisal was foxced to support the 1973 Arab
oil embargo.

He did not feel that settlement of the Arab-Israeli-Pales-

tinian question required the total elimination of the etate of Israel compared to the views of the more radical Arab states like Libya.

King

Faisal's attempt to try and solve or settle a number of differences
among the Arab states met with failure.
his domestic reforms in Saudi Arabia.
on March 25, 1975 .

He was more successful with
King Faisal wae assassinated

Crown Prince Khalid became king, and has vowed

to follow the policies that the late King Faisal pursued.

History of Oil in Saudi Arabia
There was no special interest in developing Saudi Arabia I s oil
potentialities during the early 1920 1 s .

However, when oil was being

commercially produced in Bahrain around 1932, the various oil com-

..........

"
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panies began to show some interest in obtaining concessions in Saudi
Arabia .

Standard of California was the first oil company to obtain ex-

ploration rights, after agreeing to King Ibn Saud I s terms.

The terms

dictated that oil companies must first agree on concessions before they
could carry on any explorations .

Standard of California's exploration

was promising, so in 1936 it sold half an interest in its concessions to
the Texas Oil Company for about $21 million,

The terms were $3 mil-

lion payable in cash and $18 million to be paid back at the rate of twentyfive cents on each barrel of oil produced.

8

In l 938, oil was discovered in commercial quantities in the
Damman field.
Saudi Arabia .
cans.

This brought concession seekers in large numbers to
The Italians, Germans, and Japanese joined the Ameri-

In May, 1939, King Ibn Saud granted concessions to Standard of

California in the form of a supplemental agreement .

The agreement

dictated that a specified amount of money be charged for every metric
ton of crude oil produced, plus some fixed rental charges until oil was
produced in commercial quantities .

The company was given exclusive

rights to search, produce, refine and transport oil and oil products.
There was no taxation or imposition; it was to supply free of charge
limited quantities of gasoline and kerosene to the government for ordinary use, and this was not to be sold by the government , either to
individuals in Saudi Arabia or abroad.

8

ARAMCO (Arabian -American Oil Company)
Aramco was the name given in 1944 to Standard of California.
From its small beginning in 1933, Aramco developed into one of the
greatest oil companies in the world .

The first commercial oil field

was discovered at Damman in March, 1938, and around the end of 1951,
it was producing 90, 000 barre ls per day.
discovered in March , 1940.

The Abu Hadriya field was

The Abqaiq field was discovered in Novem -

ber of 1940, and by the end of 1951, it was producing 590,000 barrels
per day.

The Qatif and Amin Dar fields were discovered in June, 1945,

with a daily production of 20, 000 and 150, 000 barrles respectively.
The off-shore well Safaniya was discovered in May, 1951.

By the end

of 1953, 137 wells were producing about 845,000 barrels per day.
Table l shows the rate of production achieved within fifteen years.
Pipelines and refineries (the most notable is Ras Tanura), as well as
tanker loading stations were built.
After experiencing a slowdown in growth rates following the
Arab-Israeli War of 196 7, the production of oil in Saudi Arabia has
been constantly increasing.

It rose from 356. 6 million barrels in 1955

to 1, 704. 8 million in 1971, and 2,201. 8 million barrels in 1972 9 (see
Table 2).

In 1972 for instance, Saudi Arabia was responsible for 60

percent of the total increase in oil production in the non-communist
world.

Similarly, after concluding the profit-sharing agreement be-

tween Saudi Arabia and Aramco, the country's oil revenues also rose.

9
TABLE 1
SAUDI ARABIAN OIL PRODUCTION , 1938-1954
Year

In Tons

In Barrels

Daily Average
{in barrels l

1938

65,618

580,000

1939

521, 2 14

3,934,000

11, 000

1940

672,154

5,075,000

50,000

1941

570,046

4,310,000

12,000

1942

600,351

4, 530, 000

12,000

1943

645,860

4,868,000

13,000

1944

1,034,603

7,794,000

21,000

1945

2,825,990

21,311,000

59,000

1946

7,899,675

59,944,000

165,000

1947

11,813,668

89,852,000

246,000

1948

18,751,270

142,853,000

390,000

1949

22,820,783

174,009,000

477,000

1950

26, 196, 852

199,547,000

547,000

1951

36,608,585

277,963,000

770,000

1952

39,870,805

301,861,000

825,000

1953

40,887, 754 .

308,294,000

845,000

1954

46,174,073

347,800,000

953,000

SOURCE: Benjamin Shwadran, The Middle East Oil and the
Great Powers (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), p. 309.

10
The profit-sharing agreement is also commonly referred to as the
11

50-50 11 profit sharing agreement.

December 1950.

This agreement was reached on 30

Oil revenues rose from $56. 7 million in 1950 to $110

million in 1951. lO In addition, it rose from $340. 8 million in 1955 to
$1,149 . 7 million in 1970, and then jumped to $1,944.9 million in 1971.

11

Since then oil revenues have been constantly rising, reaching the amount
of $2,734.1 million in 1972 (see Table 3).

This continuous rise is due

to higher oil exports and higher crude oil prices used in calculating
Saudi Arabian income tax.

Saudi Arabian oil revenues were estimated

at $4. 7 billion for 1973, and were expected to reach $21 billion in
1974,

12

and $33 billion by 1976.

Aramco Relations with the Government
The "Nationalization" of Aramco has been progressing in stages
since 1973 , when the Saudi government acquired 25 per cent stake in
the producer as sets of the company.

This stake covers drilling equip -

ment, storage tanks and port facilities, but does not include the refinery at Ras Tanura, which processes about 140,000 barrels per day of
natural gasoline liquids and 500, 000 barrels per day of crude; nor does
it cover the Trans-arabian pipeline (tapline) which runs from Qaisumah
to Sidon in Lebanon.

Tapline stopped operating in 1975 because it

proved uneconomical initially, and finally because the Lebanese Civil
War erupted .
Discussions have been going on since 1974 in regards to the

l l

TABLE 2
SAUDI OIL PRODUCTION, 1967-72

Year

Annual Production
(million barrels)

Daily Average
(million barrels)

Percent
Growth

1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

l, 023. 8
l, 114. l
1,173.9
1,386,3
1,740.8
2,201.8

2.8
3.0
3.2
3.8
4.8
6. O

7.8
8.8
5. 3
18. 1
25. 1
26.4

SOURCE: Sheikh Rustum Ali, Saudi Arabia and Oil Diplomacy
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976).

TABLE 3
CRUDE OIL OUTPUT AND GOVERNMENT OIL REVENUES
Year
1938
1945
1948
1950
1951
1955
1956
1960
1965
1967
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975

Output
(Million Barrels)

o. 5
2 l. 3
142.9
199.5
278.0
356.6
366.8
481. 4
804.9
1,023.8
1,386.7
1,740.6
2,202. 0
2,772.6
3, 09 5. 1
2,582.5

Revenues
(Million Dollars)
0.2
5. 0
31. 5
56.7
11 o. 0
340.8
290. 2
333.7
664. 1
903.6
1, 214. 0
1,884.9
2,744.6
4,340.0
22,573.5
25,676.2

SOURCE: Ramon Knauerhase, The Saudi Arabian Economx
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975, pp. 194, 287.

12
final 100 percent nationalization of Aramco and the future role of the
four U.S. partners as explorers, producers and marketers for the
company.

By September 1976, it became clear that a takeover was

agreed upon.

The four companies (Exxon, Texaco, Standard of Cali-

fornia and Mobile Oil), were to receive a book price of their total
assets and a guarantee to sell the companies around 7 million barrels
of crude oil a day for marketing abroad.

Since the companies were

allowed in the agreement to continue exploration and production, they
would be paid a premium on new reserves they discovered, and also a
fee of around 21 cents would be given to them for each barrel lifted by
Aramco, or a flat fee of 15 cents for each barrel lifted in Saudi Arabia.
These incentives were given by the government so that Aramco
would continue to search for oil in the country.

This is very important

since Aramco has continuously been discovering new oil resources each
year in Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia's probable reserves as of 1975

have been estimated at nearly 180 million barrels, while proved reserves stand at 107,857 million barrels during the same year.

13

With

the limit which Saudi Arabia has placed on production, that is 8. 5 million barrels per day averaged over one year, the proved reserves
estimated to last about 35 years from 1975 and if the probable reserve
holds, production could continue for another 22 years from the same
year.
Another reason why the Saudi government wants to keep Aramco

13
In 1975 Aram-

is simply because it will be assured of a stable market.

co was committed to marketing about 7 million barrels of oil a day t o
the industrialized west.

This is also very important to Saudi Arabia

for she depends largely on oil for her economic development.

Although

Saudi Arabia currently has no cash r equirements to satisfy, she still
needs a market for that matter a stable market for her oil resources.
She must continue to utilize her oil resources for r elevant development
purposes before either her oil resources run out , or the major consumers turn to alternative energy sources .

This will be a part of one

of the propositions in this thesis.

Statement of purpose
This study seeks to analyze the role of oil in Saudi Arabia's
foreign policy.

In 1973 Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations success-

fully used their oil resources to apply pressure on the United States of
America to modify her strong support of the State of Israel.
Arabia played a significant role in the 1973 oil embargo.

Saudi

This thesis

will examine Saudi Arabia's role in the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo, and
what prompted her participation considering the fact that she is less
radical than most of her Arab neighbors.

The 1973 Arab o il embargo

was more successful than for example the 1967 embargo.
Arabia's participation helped to create this difference.

Saudi

The oil weapon

will definitely be effective whenever applied uniformly by the Arabs
against the west , especially now, and possibly in the near future.

How-
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ever, it will be unwise for the Arabs to continuous l y depend on the oil
weapon since their oil resources cannot last forever .

As Dr. Sheikh

Rustum Ali stated in his book entitled Saudi A r abia and Oil Diplomacy,
alternative energy resources are still abundant.

The western hemis -

phere o r industrialized nations need only to app ly their financial resources and technology to develop these resources.

It obviously won't

be an easy task for them to do so, now or in the near future , however it
could be done.

When this becomes a re ality, the demand for oil will be

sharply reduced, which will in turn deprive it of its present significance
and of its role as a political weapon in international affair s .
This study will examine the alternative sources of energy being
developed in the west, notably nuc l ear energy.

Nuclear energy plants

are r apidly being built in the western industrialized nations de spite
some oppositions by citizen groups within these va r ious nations.

The r e

is evidence that these projects are favorable to some oil producing
nations, including Saudi A r abia.

Efficient use of energy is currentl y

an important is sue among the industrialized as well as the nonindustrialized nations.

The interest fo r alternative sourc es of energy

is growing , partially due to higher oil prices.

The high price of oil is

forcing the United States for example (a victim of the 1973 A r ab oil
embargo ) to rapidly seek alternative as we ll as new sources of energy.
Solar ene r gy is anothe r alternative source of ene r gy being de veloped.

This along with nuclear energy could be significant a lterna -

tives to oil when successfully developed.
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Statement of Propositions
These are the major propositions that will be supported in this
thesis: Saudi Arabia fully supported the 1973 oil embargo, (1) to show
her support of the muslim Arab nations, thus promoting unity among
them; (2) to show her fear of Israel ' s ideological stand, which she considers too extreme, and radical; (3) to have Israel withdraw from A rah
lands occupied during the 196 7 war; ( 4) to gain respect and recognition
from the western industrialized nations; (5) to take up a leadership role
among the Arab nations in the Mid - East, since her participation was
cruc ial to the success of the embargo.

Saudi Arabia has the largest

oil (known) reserves in the world.

Methodology
The methodology followed is a descriptive analysis with some
statistical data to substantiate certain statements or propositions.
Political, economic and international aspects of petroleum will be covered in this study.

However, more emphasis will be placed on the politi-

cal aspects of the use of petroleum as a weapon in international affairs.
The oil embargo and Arab - Israeli problem vis - a-vis Saudi Arabia will
be the major focus of this study.

Finally, I will draw some significant

conclusions in the final chapter of the thesis .
The thesis is divided into six chapters.

Chapter One contains

some backgTound information about Saudi Arabia .

Included in this back-

ground information are Geography, People, Government and History of
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Oil in Saudi Arabia.

The Statement of Purpose, Statement of Proposi-

tions and Methodology are also included.

These will aid the reader in

understanding what will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

Chapter

Two deals with the relationship between Saudi Arabia and OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) and OAP EC (Organization
of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries); i.e., Saudi policies and OPEC,
Saudi policies and OAPEC, as well as the policies of other gulf states
in both OPEC and OAPEC; included are the policies of Algeria and
Libya vis-a-vis OPEC and OAPEC.

Since the thesis deals with Saudi

petro-diplomacy, her policies and those of the other oil exporting countries who combine to form OPEC and OAPEC should be explored vis-avis the 1973 Arab oil embargo, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Chapter

Three is entirely devoted to the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict,
and the ''united 11 Arab efforts in trying to promote the Palestinian-Arab
cause.

Chapter Four deals with the Saudi policy and the Arab oil em-

bargo, i.e., what role Saudi Arabia played during the oil embargo.

It

is obvious that the success of the 19 73 oil embargo was due to the Saudi
participation.

Chapter Five deals with the quest for energy security by ,

the industrialized nations.

The question of alternative energy sources

being discovered is discussed.

Chapter Six, the concluding chapter,

summarizes the various topics and points discussed, and makes some
general recommendations.
This study is based on Saudi Arabia, oil diplomacy and power
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pressure.

Very little work has been done within the disciplines of

political science and international relations on this subject.

So the

author hopes that this thesis will be a significant contribution to both
disciplines.
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CHAPTER II

SAUDI ARABIA AND OPEC

The Middle East is still generally viewed as a developing area.
The citizens of the area still lack political experience and administrative skills.

A sudden influx of money and sophistication in technologi-

cal innovations within one generation has d ras tically changed the region.
Oil revenues made these changes possible.

However, the various

count ries had to struggle against the giant oil companies that were
ope rating within their boundaries.

These oil companies were outsiders

to the region and they have amassed great wealth for themselves .

As

a result, they were always viewed with suspicion in the area.
The best solution to this problem of being cheated would natur ally be to unite.

If all the members of the area had united against

foreign oil companies, they could possibly have obtained their maximum rights and prevented the foreigners from cheating and exploiting
them of their God -given treasures.

But unity presupposed a number

of factors: That a sense of common objectives existed and continues
to exist; that a willingness to make sacrifices for the sake of a com mon cause existed; that the members of the union possessed the ability
for sustained planned effort to achieve the distant goal; and that there
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existed suitable, able and skillful leaders who were recognized by all
members, as the personification of the ideal of unity and most impor tant, were trusted by all.

14

These prerequisites did not always exist

in the different moves for unity in the Middle East.
Since 1959, three organizations were set up in the Middle East

to encourage unity against the oil companies: The Arab Petroleum
Congress, The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
and its related organization, The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC).

For this paper, I will neglect all aspects

dealing with the Arab Petroleum Congress and thereby concentrate on
the organizations that are still in existence--OPEC and OAPEC.

The

present essay will trace the origins of OPEC and the evolution of its
program.
The representatives of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and
Venezuela assembled in Baghdad on 14 September 1960, to form the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

Their immediate

concern was with the pricing practices of the major international oil
companies.

The oil producing countries were keenly conscious of the

fact that their oil revenues, accounting for most of their government
budgets, depended on prices set by a tightly interlocking group of companies with headquarters in the United States or in Europe.
The companies decided where and when to prospect for oil.

It

were the companies again that decided how much oil to produce once it
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was found, and it were the companies that , in the light of their assessment of the market, set the price at which it would be sold.

Although

the companies operating in each country were legally distinct, there
was a pattern of interlocking ownership:

British Petroleum (BP),

Shell, Mobil, and Exxon were part-owners of the three companies operating in Iraq; Exxon, Texaco, California Standard, and Mobil jointly
owned Aramco, which operated in Saudi Arabia; Exxon, Shell and Gulf,
through affiliates operated separately in Venezuela; Gulf and BP jointly
held shares in the Iranian consortium that replaced BP after the crisis
of 1951-54.

In the world at large, between 1949 and 1950, these seven

companies controlled 65 percent of proved reserves of petroleum outside the Soviet bloc, 55 percent of its production, 57 percent of all refinery capacity and major pipelines, and through ownership of longterm leases, at least 67 percent of all privately owned tanker space.
In 1959 and 1960, the companies once more displayed their
control and power by cutting prices all along the line, in an effort to
compete with coal in the rapidly growing energy markets in Europe
and Japan.

Such activities prompted governments of oil - producing

countries to coordinate policies .

Venezuela had put out feelers to

Middle East governments as early as 1947 for this purpose,

Iraq and

Saudia Arabia in 1953 had concluded an agreement calling for exchange
of information and periodic consultation regarding petroleum.

And an

Arab petroleum conference in Cairo in 1959 adopted a resolution insist-
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ing that any changes in posted price should be discussed with the government of the producing country.

The major initiatives of this La.tin

American - Middle Easte rn rapprochement that was to form the basis of
OPEC were taken by the Venezuelan Minister of Mines and Hydrocarbons, Juan Perez Alfonso, and Saudi Arabian Pe troleum Minister Sheikh
Abdullah Tariki.
The member countries of OPEC today embrace different politi cal complexions, levels of development and cultures in Asia, Africa
and La.tin America.

Full national control of their oil resources, which

included the control to transportation, refining and distribution later
became another goal sought by OPEC member nations.
Between 1951 and 1953, Iran attempted to take unilateral action
against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which was then the concession
holder.

This met with resistance from the major oil companies, and

to show their solidarity, they instituted a boycott on Iranian oil and
thus largely thwarted Iran's designs.
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The conflict ended in a formal

recognition of the nationalization , however the basic pattern of control
and profit-sharing was the same as that of her neighboring countries.
Similarly, when Iraq nationali zed a large portion of the Iraq petroleum
company 's concession area in 1961, and late r refused offers of settlement, the companies penalized it by restricting production in favor of
a higher output in other producing countries of the region. 16
The position of weakness characterized by oil producing countries
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and the corresponding strength of the companies could be att ributed to
three, interrelated factors:

" The existence of a buyers' market, the

self- sufficiency of the United States as a producer and consumer of oil,
and the dominant position of the major oil companie s. 111 7 These factors were completely rever sed in the early seventies .

The OPEC

members as a group could now afford to worry less about production
increases and concentrate on prices.

Individual member states have

gradually accepted output restrictions as a legitimate and viable policy
alternative .

Some countries accepted the policy purely on grounds for

conse rvation, or on the mobility to use effectively the revenue surpluses
that even before 1973 had been accumulated by some states .

Saudi

Arabia is an example of this, as opposed to Iran that is still concerned
about rapid economic development and a strong military status.
Until the outbreak of the October war, it was possible to find
many common denominators that held together the solidarity of OPEC
members .

This community of interests was likely to prevail ove r

potential differences, so long as major political differences did not
become involved. 18 The Arab group (OAPEC) within OPEC is an exception in that it became directly involved with the Arab-Israeli conflict, and also because it admitted and occasionally practiced the use
of oil as a weapon in the political struggle.
complished .

This was not easily ac-
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FIGURE 1
1973 Crude Petroleum Production and Petroleum Product
Consumption for Major Producing and Consuming Areas
(million barrels per day)
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Federal Energy Administration, Project Independence
Report, November 1974.
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FIGURE 2
1973 Import Levels and Proportion of 1973 Imports from
Middle East for Major Importers
(MB/D)
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FIGURE 3
1973 C rude P e t r o l e u m Reserves for
Majo r P r oduc i ng A r eas
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Saudi Arabia 1 s Policies in OAP EC
The fourth Arab - Israeli war broke out on October 6, 1973.

A

conference of Arab oil ministers was held in Kuwait on the 17th of the
same month.

At this conference it was decided that the oil weapon

would be used for the Arab cause in the Arab -Israeli conflict .
They agreed in a binding decis i on to reduce their exports by
a minimum of 5 percent as compared with the average September output, and to follow this reduction with further cuts of 5
percent per month until the completion of the total withd r awa l
of Israel from the territories occupied in 196 7 , and the r estor ation of the rights of the Palestinians, or until the production
of every individual country r eaches the point where its economy
does not permit any further reduction without detriment to its
national or A r ab obligations. l 9
Thus, the oil importing nations were to be t reated acco r ding to
their stand on the Arab - Israeli conflict: The friend l y ones were to be
exempted; the unfriendly and neutral ones were t o be subject to varying
degrees of restriction.

It was agreed that an embargo would be applied

on the United States due to her unfriendly policy toward Arabs.
Arab nation opposed the decisions and withdrew.

One

This nation was Iraq.

The others; Abu Dhabi , Algeria, Bahrein, Kuwait, Egypt, Libya,
Qatar , Saudi Arabia and Sy r ia appr oved the actions unanimous l y .

De-

spite this solidar ity, the various Arab states had different underlying
attitudes in r egards to the embargo.
Saudi Arabia hel d the key position, both economically and politically in OAPEC .

Saudi Arabia was producing 8. 5 million barrels of

oil pe r day on the eve of the war, and around the same period, the
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kingdom accounted for 40 percent of the total Arab production.
this, Saudi Arabia was bound to be influential.

With

Also , in addition to

being a country of wealth, Saudi Arabia is viewed as the center of
traditional Islam.
Middle East .

This role has extended her influence beyond the

She was also an acknowledged leader in the conservative

camp of the Arab world.

Saudi Arab ia has been cooperative with

Egypt, another moderate influential state, in deve l oping a general
Arab strategy in relations with the outside world.
Despite the militancy present among the various Palestinian
groups, Saudi Arabia supported the general Palestinian st ruggle for
the recognition of their rights, and provided aid to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

The late King Faisal's dedication to the

Palestinian cause was strengthened by his interest in Je ru salem, and
his often proclaimed determination to see its Arab part restored to
Arab control, so that he might make a pilg rimage to it s holy places.
Unfortunately, he died without realizing his dream.
The increased dedication to the Palestinian cause made Saudi
Arabia deviate from her proclaimed policy of "not m ixing oil with
politics 11 •

If during the previous crises ( 1956, 196 7) Saudi Arabia had

resorted to the use of the oil weapon, they had done so reluctantly, and
only for brief periods . ZO However, by early 1973, the continuous dead lock in the Arab-Israeli issue caused King Faisal to accept with greater
willingness the idea of using oil as a political weapon in Arab;...American

TABLE 4
CRUDE OIL OUTPUT BY MAJOR PRODUCER , 1973- 77 (' 000 barrels)
1977

1976

1975

1974

1973

3,358,906
2,079,991
826,900
757,244
706,551
608,373
401,480
160,820

3, 140, 088
2, 166,417
834,810
699,504
786,929
582,580
393,487
178,120

2, 5 83, 18 7
1,965,404
820,545
551,251
760,888
511,914
345,183
160, 343

3,096,211
2,210,627
680,860
550,784
930, 142
516,125
372, 753
189,248

2,773,887
2,152,228
717,676
796,423
1,103,165
476,348
391,890
207,924

Middle Eaet OPEC members
Saudi Arabia +
Iran
Iraq+
Libya+
Kuwait+
Abu Dhabi+
Algeria+
Qatar+
Dubai+
Total

116,452

114,681

92,842

88, 12 7

80,202

9,016,717

8,896,616

7,791,557

8,634,877

8,699.743

Other OPEC members
Venezuela
Nigeria
Indonesia
Gabon
Ecuador
Total

816,820
765,475
615,821
81,284
66,270
2,345,670

833,077
758,057
549,792
81,510
68,372
2,290,808

855, 134
651,949
481,490
81,980
58,753
2,129,306

1,086,332
822,702
501,854
81,160
64, 546
2,556,594

1, 228, 590
750,675
488,550
55,047
76,221
2,599,083

Total OPEC members

11,362,387

11,187,424

9,920,863

11,191,471

11,298,826

124,198
22,309
81, 061

106,046
24,597
53.715

106,926
24, 948
60,483

Non-OPEC Middle East states
Oman
Bahrain+
Egypt::< *+

124,760
20,429
152, 205 "~

133,795
21,287
119, 720~'

N

co

TABLE 4--Continued

1977
Non-OPEC Middle East states (continued)
73, OQQ );c
Syria +
18, zso ~c
Turkey
Total
388,644
Total Middle East
9,405 , 361
Other major states
Soviet Union

us

+

*
**

4,013,100
3 , 617,940*

1976

1975

1974

1973

70, 08Q)l{
18,615)l{
363,497
9,260, 113

65,930
21,719
315,217
8,106,774

54,352
24, 555
263,265
8, 898, 142

38, 1 70
24,273
254,800
8,954,543

3,822,000
3,558,731

3,600,025
3,647,736

3,373,650
3,818,683

3,140,288
3,995,326

Members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)
Estimate
Including Israeli-occupied Sinai

SOURCE: Oil & Gas Journal, Oklahoma, U, S., 1974-78.
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diplomacy.

On at least three occasions, King Faisal expressed his

conce r n, and issued warnings to the United States; first through his
oil minister, Sheikh Ahmed Yamani; to certain Amer ican cabinet members in April, then through Aramco's parent companies in May; and
finally through Newsweek and the BBC (British Broadcast Co. ) in
September, 1973 .
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The idea that the oil weapon would have to be employed by
adoption of restrictive measures was further emphasized through a
se ries of consultations that King Faisal had throughout the Summer of
1973, with President Sadat of Egypt.

"But the basic Saudi philosophy

in this respect was to avoid mentioning if possible, any specifically
punitive actions. 1122 Saudi Arabia and for that matter, King Faisal
was out to alert world public opinion about the Arab-Israeli conflict.
To this effect , Saudi Arabia favored adopting a decision on production
cutbacks at the Kuwa it meeting of l 7 October , 1973, and therefore sup ported only a recommendation when the issue of the embargo came up.
King Faisal had sent an important message to President Nixon before
the October 17th meeting in which he asked the U.S. to stop assishng
Israel in the war.

However, President Nixon seemed at that time to

have little regard fo r King Faisal's warnings.

On October 19th, King

Faisal learned of the president I s decision to request Congress for an
authorization to provide $2. 5 billion for arms assistance to Israel.
This prompted King Faisal I s decision to impose an embargo.

This
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decision wa s extremely crucial, because Saudi Arabia ce rtainly helped
make the embargo a total success .

Also, the success of the embargo

helped the Arabs to gain some degree of respec t and rec ognition, from
the west in particular.

This alone was a worthwhile accomplishment.

Policies of Other Gulf States
Kuwait, Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Bahrein are the smaller Arab
states of the Gulf.

These states have traditionally been clo se allies to

Saudi Arabia on several key is sues .
embargo, these states followed suit.

When King Faisal decided on an
Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Bahrein

have broadly similar political structures, and tendencies towa rd Saudi
Arabia,

These Arab states can be desc ribe d as conservative, prudent

and in favor of cooperation with the west.

Kuwait followed a more in-

dependent policy than the other three smaller Gulf states .

Also, in

contrast to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait has a constitutiona l monarchy with a
Parliament.

In addition, its close proximity to Iraq and Iran forced

it to pay close attention to the trends and moods in these two compara tively powerful countries .

"Consequently, despite its basic conse rva-

tism, Kuwait was more sensitive to domestic and external pressures
than were either Saudi Arabia or the smaller Gulf states.

1123

If Saudi Arabia stood at one end of the Arab spectrum, Iraq

can be placed at the othe r.

Ir aq is anti-imperialist and ra dical in its
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domestic and foreign policies.

Since the revolution of 1958, Iraq not

only had a history of tense relations with Washington and London, but
also regarded itself as outside the free world.

Linked by a treaty of

friendship with the Soviet Union and with a Baath dominated cabinet,
consisting of two communist ministers, Iraq was largely isolated from
the Arab community.

It maintained friendly ties with revolutionary

Libya and Marxist-oriented South Yemen.

This could partially explain

why Iraq showed such hostility and skepticism to Saudi attitudes on the
oil embargo,

At the October, 1973 meeting in Kuwait, the Iraqi dele-

gation resisted the decision on production cutbacks and acc~pted the
idea of selective embargoes .

It insisted that the cutback policy did not

distinguish sufficiently between friendly and unfriendly consumer states;
instead it proposed a more radical policy, which required an immediate
nationalization of foreign oil companies, as well as banks and any other
assets or enterprises of hostile countries that are located in the Middle East.
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To show their total support for such a policy, Iraq, on

October 7, 1973, immediately following the outbreak of the war, na ....
tional American holdings in the Basra Petroleum Company (BPC) ,
which consisted of shares owned by Exxon and Mobil.

Such an action

appeared too radical to be acceptable to the more conservative Arab
regimes.

This placed Iraq on a lonely course at the Kuwait conference ,

and it thus prompted its withdrawal from the meeting, and all other
meetings of the Arab oil ministers held throughout the period of the
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crise s of 1973 -74.

However, Iraq also joined in the embargo against

the designated consumer states .

It only refused to cut back pr oduction

and exports to other consumer nations that were not included in the
embargo.

The Positions of Algeria and L ibya
Libya and Algeria deserve some mention a l ong with other participants at the Kuwait meeting.

Algeria had the characteristics of the

moderate Arab states, as well as those of the radicals.

Algeria had

to struggle bitterly to gain its independence from France, and since
then its regimes have been known for their militancy, in both the panArab causes and the question of Palestine.

Algeria ranks below most

Arab states in the total production of oil (see Table 4), however it ac cepted the Saudi and Egyptian ide a of a partial boycott , based on production cutbacks, even though it would be expected to suffer financia lly
by taking such an action.

Also, Algeria at the time of the 1973-74

crisis had a large volume of its exports going to the Netherlands, and
this was one of the cons umer nations listed for a total embargo, along
with the United States .
Libya's Colonel Al-Qadhafi followed a militant revolutionary
ideology, thus making Libya sympathetic to Iraq's position.

H oweve r,

Colonel Qadhafi's strong Islamic orientation clashed with Iraq's toleration of Moscow and Communism.

After attempts to unite with Egypt

failed in 1972, relations between the two countries wer e strained.

Also,
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Colonel Qadhafi was unhappy at having been excluded from the planning
and waging of the October war.

However, Libya did not want to further

isolate itself from the Arab community by refusing to go along with the
oil embargo.

If Libya had adopted Iraq's policy of nationalizing Ameri-

can interests, the results might prove different.

When Iraq made its

move, it was viewed as an accounting operation, since Exxon and
Mobil, the two American companies concerned, were only remote
shareholders in an operating company--the Basra Petroleum Company.
The action did disrupt the Basra Petroleum Company's production process.

With a few exceptions, American companies in Libya held di -

rect concessions, and this formed a large portion of Libya I s production.

To nationalize them, during the period of crisis could obviously

affect Libya's production and consequently result in a denial of supplies to many consumers in excess of the cutbacks proposed in Kuwait.
So to secure its own interests as well, Libya went along with the
moderate cutback policy proposed at the Kuwait conference.
unlike Iraq complied fully with the embargo policy.

Libya,
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CHAPTER III

SAUDI ARABIA AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Saudi Arabia has maintained a long history of involvement in
the disputes between the Jews and Arabs over the question of Pales tine, which later became known as the State of Israe l.

King Ibn Saud

was among the first Saudi leaders who voiced strong suppo rt for the
Palestinian-Arab cause.

He maintained that Palestine is an Arab land

to which the Jews have no right.

Saudi Arabia has also provided st r ong

financial assistance to the Pa l estinians .
On January 8, 1940, H . St . John Philby, an adviser to lbn Saud,
suggested a plan to the King that was aimed at solving the Pale stinian
problem.

Philby 1 s solution was that Palestine -should be left to the

Jews, and the displaced Arabs should be resettled somewhere else, at
the expense of the Jews, who would place a sum of L20 million at the
disposal of the king fo r this purpose. 25 When he presented the plan
to Ibn Saud, the king asked Philby to keep the matter strictly confidential, since his safety might be in danger if othe r Arabs heard about it. 26
On February 12, 1945 , Ibn Saud left Jeddah on board the American destroyer Quincy to meet with P res ident Roosevelt, who was re turning from the Yalta Conference .

They met at the Great Bitter Lake
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on the Suez Canal.
tinian question.

The topic of their discussion centered on the Pales-

Roosevelt assured Ibn Saud that he would avoid doing

anything that might harm the Palestinian-Arab cause.

Roosevelt also

stated that "the U.S. gove rnment would make no change in its basic
policy in Palestine without full and prior consultation with both the Jews
and Arabs.

11
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After Ibn Saud met with Roosevelt, he met with Churchill on the
shore of Lake Karun .

Churchill clearly stated to Ibn Saud that his

policy was to maintain Palestine as a "national home for the Jews"·
Ibn Saud strongly disagreed with such a policy.

He told Churchill that

Palestine is an Arab land to which the Jews have no right. 2 8
V i olence between the Arabs and Jews which had been prevalent
since the end of World War II continued in Palestine.

When war broke

out in May of 1948 between the Arabs and Jews , Saudi Arabia only sent
a few units of its troops to Palestine. 2 9 Ibn Saud cooperated in the
boycott of Israel, however he did not cut off oil production, nor did he
cancel the American oil concession. 3 o He expressed his disappointment at Roosevelt who did not stick to his promise.

lbn Saud maintain-

ed that the European Jews should return to their home countrie s in
Europe, since Germany was defeated in World War ll, which supposedly
eliminated all Nazi threats to the Jew s.
In 1956, Egypt was attacked by Britain, F rance, and Israel.

Saudi Arabia condemned the attack and called on all Arabs to do like-

\
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wise.

Also. Saudi Arabia strongly supported Egypt's nationalization

of the Suez Canal.
Again in June, 1967, war broke out between the Jews and Arabs.
This time the confrontation was mainly between Israel and three other
Arab states, Egypt. Syria and Jordan.

This war became known as the

Six-day War which was won by Israel.

For the first time Saudi Arabia.

then under King Faisal showed less concern about the outcome of a war
between the Arabs and Israel, simply because he had strained relations with Egyptian President Nasser.

"But aware of Arab nationalist

sentiments, King Faisal called for the annihilation of Israel, and sent
troops to Jordan, although they did not engage in extensive fighting. 1131
Jamil Baroody, the Saudi Arabian representative at the United
Nations emphasized in a speech given before the United Nations General Assembly, that " the whole creation of Israel was illegal and immoral, to say the least " . 32 According to Baroody, conquerors had
come and gone from Alexander the Great, the Romans, and the Crusaders, to the mandatory powers.

He said of them:

Conquerors all , but the bones of their troops have. throughout the ages, bleached our soil, and their works are more
relics for the tourists to see. They are gone- - all _.gone-those conquerors of yore. But the Arabs, in spite of all the
vicissitudes that have shaped their destiny:, still remain-approximately a hundred million of.them. 33
A summit meeting was held in Khartoum after the end of the
1967 war.

At this meeting, Saudi Arabia pledged $140 million to the

Arab cause.

Even though Saudi Arabia was experiencing a financial
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crisis during this period, it made all efforts to fulfill its financial
commitment.
Relations did not improve much between the Arabs and Israel
after the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict.

When Nasser died and Sadat suc-

ceeded him, he immediately pointed out that only through war could
the problems between the Arabs and Israel be solved.

Sadat stated in

April, 1973, during an interview with Newsweek, that "everything in
this country is now being mobilized in earnest for a resumption of the
battle.

11
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In October, 1973, war broke out again between the Arabs and
Israel.

Saudi Arabia played a significant role in this war , which also

became known as the Yorn Kippur War.

Although it was reported that

Saudi forces were placed on alert when the war started, there was no
evidence to show whether they were actually involved in direct combat.
However, Saudi Arabia led ten Arab oil-producing nations in using
their oil wealth as a political weapon.

On October 17, 1973 Saudi

Arabia and the other Arab oil-producing nations agreed to reduce by
5 percent each month the amount of oil they export.

The following day,

Saudi Arabia cut oil production by 10 percent to put pres sure on the
United States.

On October 20, 1973, a total oil embargo was imposed

on the United States.

This move placed Saudi Arabia in a position of

leadership among the Arab states.

Since oil is an extremely important

source of energy for the western industrialized nations, which are
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heavily dependent on oil, the use of the Arab oil weapon was effective.
King Faisal, like his predecessors, strongly believed that the
creation of a Jewish state within the Muslim world was due to the
communist-zionist-imperialist conspi racy against Islam.

King Faisal

said:
We cannot and will not ignore the fo r ces which oppose our
efforts today. There a r e the evil forces of imperialism and
the sinister forces of Judaism and Zionism and the forces of
C ommunism . As to imperia lism, it opposes our preaching
of Islam because it knows that Islam is a religion of brotherhood, a religion of peace, a religion of love, a religion of
equality . . . As to the forces of Zionism , they know that
coope ra tion between Muslims would put an end to the evil expansionist ideas of international Zionism in Is lamic and Arab
countries. As fo r the Communist , they are attacking us because the Islamic movement is going to dest r oy all that Communism stands for . . . 3 5
It was King Faisal 1 s be lief that after struggling against the
Ottoman and European imperialism, the Arabs should not subject themselves to a similar situation by replacing the old fo r ces with the new
fo r ces he referr ed to as Z ionism and Communism.

King Faisal 1 s sue-

cessor has promised to follow his stand on issues like Islamic solidarity, Arab unity, and the liberation of Jerusalem.
Today, one could say that Saudi Arabia, like other Arab states ,
has comp romi sed partially its basic stance against Isra el.

The o rig-

inal stance of the Arabs was to dismantle Israel completely from the
Middle East.

This p osition has been modified by most Arab nations ,

and they now urge Israel to withdraw within the 1967 borders .
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Saudi Arabia and Pan-Arabism
Pan-Arabism and anti-Zionism are two issues that have dominated Saudi Arabian policy in the Middle East since the creation of the
State of Israel.

In the 1930 ' s, Saudi Arabia entered into treaties with

neighboring Arab states on the basis of strengthening Islamic friendship and Arab brotherhood.

These treaties were entered into with the

then three independent Arab states--Yemen , Iraq and Egypt .

In 1934,

the treaty of Taif, which provided for a settlement of differences through
negotiation, ended the border war between Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
In 1936, Iraq concluded a treaty of Arab brotherhood with Saudi Arabia.
In 1945, Saudi Arabia joined the British formed Arab League.
The original purpose of the Arab League was to strengthen the relationship between member states .

King lbn Saud agreed to join the

League under the condition that each member state be guaranteed that
their respective independence and sovereignty would be safeguarded,
and that each would refrain from attempting to change the form of
government of any member state.

Since then, Saudi Arabian relations

have been oriented to the individual member states rather than to the
Arab League, as a whole.
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In 1948, when the State of Israel was created, Saudi Arabia
and the other Arab nations opposed the idea of establishing a Jewish
homeland in the Arab world, and made contribution to the several
Arab war efforts against Israel.

Since Saudi Arabia does not have a

41

strong military capability, its contribution militarily to the Arab war
effort against Israel is limited.

However, Saudi Arabia has made

large financial contributions to aid other Arab states fighting the war
against Israel.
Egypt is a good example of Arab nations that have received
aid from Saudi Arabia to fight for the Arab cause against Israel.
Ibn Saud I s first official tour abroad was to Egypt.
Egypt was economically depressed.

King

During this period,

The first Arab-Israeli war and a

corrupt leadership under King Farouk contributed to this problem.

Ibn

Saud offered Egypt a yearly subsidy of approximately $4 million to help
improve its economy.

When Ibn Saud died in 1953, his successor,

King Saud continued his pan-Arab policy.

Under King Saud, Saudi

Arabia signed a five-year mutual defense pact with Egypt and Syria.
Also, the armies of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria formed a joint command.

King Saud showed his position of neutralism by joining the other

Arab states that opposed the Baghdad Pact.
Relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt began to deteriorate
when President Nasser of Egypt began to adopt his concept of Arab
Socialism.

The Saudi leadership was apprehensive of revolutionary

incursion into the kingdom, which has always pursued a conservative
route.

After King Saud's visit to the United States in January of 1957,

he turned away from Nasser and associated himself with the conservative kings of Jordan and Iraq. 3 8 King Saud was very concerned over
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Nasser's growing popularity in the Arab world, and also his proSoviet policies.
tionary.

President Nasser accused King Saud of being a rea c -

The formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) between

Egypt and Syria further aggravated the relations between the two Arab
states.

Saudi Arabia accused Nasser of interfering in the internal

affairs of othe r Arab states.

Finally, a Saudi plot to assassinate

Nasser was revealed. 39 Egypt and Saudi Arabia began to pursue different courses.

Egypt turned more toward the Soviet Union and Saudi

Aragia more toward the west.

This started a long period of uneasy re-

lations between the two Arab states.

The uneasy relationship culmi-

nated int o a war between Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

The main cause of

the confrontation centered around an internal conflict in Yemen.

Egypt

gave military support to the new Republicans in Yemen and Saudia
Arabia gave support to the Royalists.

As a result of the confrontation,

the Egyptian air force bombed Saudi Arabian towns and villages.
Finally Saudi Arabia broke diplomatic relations with Egypt and formed
a joint defense council with Jordan.
When King Saud was dethroned, Faisal became King of Saudi
Arabia.

Faisal was a better administrator and more pragmatic than

his predecessor.

He resumed a rapproachment between the two Arab

nations and also restored diplomatic relations.
sonified Arab radicalism with Nasser.
re conciliation.

Faisal merely per-

This brought about a period of

The new King of Saudi Arabia and Nasser decided to
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settle the Yemen crisis peacefully.

Egypt agreed to withdraw its troops

from Yemen.
Israel gained additional territory during the 1967 Arab-Israeli
War.

This made Saudi Arabia uneasy.

Saudi Arabia was considered

safe from direct Israeli threat since it does not share any borders with
the Jewish state.

However, after the 1967 war, it was feared that

Israel might decide to attack Saudi Arabia.

At the summit meeting in

Khartoum, the Arab heads of state decided that there would be no
direct negotiation, no formal peace, and no recognition between the
Arab states and Israel.

King Faisal proposed that Egypt and Jordan

be compensated by the Arab oil-producing countries for their war
losses.

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya agreed to put up a combined

subsidy of $392 million a year for Egypt and Jordan, ~O This move
triggered by the common threat of Israel removed bitter struggling
between Saudia Arabia and Egypt.
King Faisal's outlook of the Arab-Israeli conflict took a drastic
change after the Khartoum conference:
As anti-Zionist as he was anti-Communist, the king lavishly
subsidized Arab governments battling Israel. He grew even
more bitter against Israel in recent years, most often making no distinction between religious Jews (whom he professed
to respect) and political Zionists, 4l
When Nasser died, Arab Socialism suffered a setback in the
Middle East.

Nasser ' s successor, Sa da t, has been preoccupied with

the continuing Arab - Israeli problem,

It is believed by many that when
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King Faisal visited Cairo in 1972, among the various issued discussed,
the expulsion of the Russians from Egypt, took precedent.

The United

States asked King Faisal to try and convince Sadat to expel the Russia ns from Egypt.

In the Spring of 1972, Washington suggested to Faisal that if
he would help pursuade President Anwar Sadat to reduce
Russian presence in Egypt, America would press Israel to
withdraw from conquered Arab territory. 42
King Faisal ' s major source of conflict with the United States centered
around the question of Israel, however he admired the United States
anti-communist policy.

President Nixon was unable to convince Israel

to withdraw from the Arab territory after Sadat expelled the Russians
from Egypt.

Sadat imposed limited state ownership of property, thus

denationalizing the various institutions that were nationalized by Nasser.
Sadat thus adopted an anti - communist stand.
The Faisal-Sadat relationship had other compelling reasons,
deeply rooted in inter•Arab politics.

Faisal's strongest critic within

the Arab world was Libya's President Qaddafi, whom Sadat considers
an irrational person.

By gaining influence over Sadat, King Faisal

minimized the principal appeal Qaddafi has had for a union with Egypt. 43
Saudi Arabia ' s relations with the other Arab monarchies and the Gulf
states are fairly normal.

Saudi Arabia, under King Faisal has im-

proved relations with revolutionary oriented regimes in Syria, Iraq and
Algeria.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has an office in

Saudi Arabia.

However, because of Saudi Arabia I s policy of anti-
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communism and Islamic brotherhood, it does not recognize the PLO
faction led by George Habash, a Christian, who is also suspected to be
a Communist.

Since the 1973 oil embargo, Saudi Arabia has become a

leader within the Arab world.

With this role, it has helped mediations

between Arab states engaged in conflicts of various kinds.

And, most

significant of all, it has aided in bringing an end to the long standing
differences that existed between King Hussein of Jordan and PLO leader
Arafat .
Faisal's successor, King Khalid has so far maintained good relations with most of the Arab states.

He has largely followed Faisal I s

policies in regards to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Saudi Arabian
role.

Saudi Arabia and the United States
Despite American support of Israel and the 1973 Arab oil embargo, relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States have remained fairly normal since officially established in 1940.

The kingdom

has dealt with private American citizens since 1933 when Aramco,
then Standard of California received an exclusive 60 year oil concession, from King Abd al-Aziz.
May 29, 1933.

Aramco obtained the oil concession on

When a new concession agreement was signed between

Aramco and Saudi Arabia on May 31, 1939, the king had turned down
a good offer from Japan.

The reason for turning down the Japanese

offer was that he preferred to contin~e association with the Americans;

...
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since it had the advantage of assuring the economic development of the
country, without incurring political liabilities. 44
P rivate American oil investments provided the starting point
for current Saudi-American relations.

The U.S. government had no

direct influence over Aramco's operations in Saudi Arabia until the
outbreak of World War II.

When Italy bombed Dhahran in 1940, this

halted pilgrim traffic and thus led to loss of revenues for the kingdom.
Saudi Arabia could not receive any loans from the United States government.

President Roosevelt had to suggest to the British govern-

ment to continue making financial assistance available to Saudi Arabia,
since the region was their sphere of influence.

The U.S. government

later expressed some interest in the British oil concessions in the
Middle East.

However Aramco successfully stopped the government

from pursuing their expressed interest.

The company used its weap-

on, ..the traditional free enterprise suspicion of any government interference with a penetration into business. 1145 Aramco officials have
frequently served as informal advisers to the king and his ministers.
Also , some of these officials have served in the capacity of unofficial
ambassador in Washington where a company office is maintained.
Saudi Arabia's friendship with the United States and the constantly gr.owing wealth in oil has given the kingdom great prestige and
influence in the Arab world.

Aleo, King Faisal's role in promoting

the Palestine cause has made him, as well as the country very popular.
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The leadership role in the Arab world seems to be passing from Egypt
to Saudi Arabia.

Not only were the Egyptians and other Arabs begin-

ning to pay attention t o the deeds and words emanating from the feudal
monarchy, but the rest of the w or l d was commencing to flatter King
Faisal as he became the number one international banker.

It has also

been estimated that within three years Saudi Arabia will have greate r
financial reserves than the United States, Western Europe and Japan
combined. 46 The liberation of Jerusalem continues to be the major
source of conflict between the Unit ed States and Saudia Arabia.
During the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Saudi Arabia had reluc tantly joined the Arab effort to withhold oil only after extensive pressure from Nasser, but lifted the embargo soon after
its imposigion. In 197 3, it joined with Arab oil-producing
nations in imposing the oil embarg. Indeed, Saudia Arabia
forshadowed its major role in the October war when on
September 4, 1973, King Faisal told Americans via U.S.
television that American support of Israel makes it extremely difficult for us to continue to supply the United
States petroleum needs and even to maintain our friendly relations. 47
On October 18, 1973, Radio Riyadh announced King Faisal's
decision to cut down oil production by 10 percent. 48 The following
day President Nixon asked Congress to supply Israel with $2. 2 billion
in military ass istance . 4 9 King Faisal responded by imposing a total
embargo on the shipment of oil to the United States and the Netherlands. SO Faisal also slashed oil production by 26 percent. 5 l
Aramco operated the oil embargo for Saudi Arabia in a unique
but none-the-less quite interesting manner.

Previously, the oil com-
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panies were regarded as instruments of American foreign policy, toward the oil-producing nations .

However, during the 1973 embargo,

"they were actually used as instruments of Arab policy". SZ Aramco
complied with the Arabs by cutting off oil supplies to its own homeland.
In March of 1974, the embargo was lifted, when King Faisal
was convinced that the United States was working hard to convince
Israel to withdraw from Arab occupied land.

In return for lifting the embargo, the United States promised
to help industrialize Sa udi Arabia.

On June 8, 19 74, broad economic

cooperation agreements between the United States and Saudi Arabia
were signed in Washington.

The disclosure of the agreements was

made a few days before President Nixon left for Saudi Arabia on a
visit.

One of the agreements signed by the Secretary of State , Kissin-

ger and Saudi Arabia ' s Prince Fahd lbn Abdul Aziz

al Saud ,

provides

for the creation of a joint Economic Cooperation Commission. 53 After
these agreements were signed, the United States sold several squadrons of F-SE and F-5F jet fighters in a $756 million package deal to
the kingdom.
After President Nixon's visit to Saudi Arabia on June 15, 1974,
the kingdom leaned further toward the United States.

At this point the

only other major source of misunderstanding between the United States
and Saudi Arabia was over the soaring price of oil.

On this issue,

Saudi Arabia's oil minister Yamani had made pleas to othe r OPEC
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member nations to make an effort to hold down the price of oil.
President Ford took it upon himsE:lf to ~arn the oil-producing
nations to hold down the prices of oil.

This was received with anger

by the Iranians and Kuwaitis in particular.

King Faisal wrote a per-

sonal letter to the Shah of Iran, urging him to join Saudi Arabia in an
effort to lower the prices of oil.

However, the Shah refused. 54 King

Faisal made it clear that he was concerned that a worldwide depression
could hurt the American and western economies, which in turn would
improve the position of the largely self-sufficient Communist bloc
nations.
The relationship that has been cultivated between Saudi Arabia
and the United States since the 1930s has been maintained with freedom to pursue policies not always compatible with each other's objectives.

Under normal circumstances, this relationship will continue

to be as cordial as before, based on mutual respect.

The most seri-

ous obstacle that could possibly affect this relationship is an escalated
United States support of Israel, should another Arab-Israeli war take
place.

This would definitely mean a reimposition of the successful

weapon used in 1973 against the United States.

If an oil embargo should

be imposed again in the near future, it could prove disastrous for the
western industrialized nations, not to mention the less fortunate developing nations.
diplomacy.

In all probabilities, this will be avoided through
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CHAPTER IV

SAUDI POLICY AND THE ARAB OIL EMBARGO

The October, 1973 Arab -Israeli War as previously indicated
triggered a turning point in the history of the Arab world, because it
forced the Arabs to employ oil on a massive scale, as a bargaining
tool in international relations.

History has shown that the use of eco-

nomic resources as an inst rum ent of political pressure is one of man's
oldest games.

Few wars have been fought that did not have underlying

economic causes or ties.

Nations that have been blessed with ample

economic resources have used this weapon to achieve political ends.
The employment of oil as a political weapon has been a recurring idea in Arab political thought since the early forties , and there
has been two major efforts by the Arabs to use their oil in this capa city before 1973.

These two previous attempts failed to produce any

significant political results beyond mere temporary disruptions in
world oil trade.

The first of these attempts occurred after the Anglo-

French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956.

The flow of oil from Northern

Iraq to the Mediterranean Coast was interrupted because one of the
pump stations on the IPC pipeline system transiting Syria was destroyed .
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TABLE 5
THE SUPPLY-DEMAND SQUEEZE
American Oil Demand

Amount required from
Eastern Hemisphere

1973

l 7-18 million barrels
per day (b/d)

3. 5 million b/d approx.

1980
(projection)

24-27 million b /d

8-11 million b/d out of
total imports of 12-15
million b/d

World Oil Demand

Middle East
Production Required

1972

44. 7 million b/d

18 million b/d

1980
(projection)

74-78 million b/d

40-45 million b/d *

*This figure cannot be achieved unless Saudi Arabia, whose reserves are conservatively estimated at 150 billion barrels (26 per cent
of the non-communist world's total), consents to an increase of output
from 8. 3 million b/d (September 1973) to 20 million in 1980.
SOURCE: Federal Energy Administration, Project Independence Report,
November 1974.

The second attempt occurred when several Arab oil-producing
countries imposed an embargo on oil supplies to the U.S., Britain and
West Germany following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

The Arabs suf-

fered defeat in both incidents, and their attempts to use oil as a political
weapon also failed.

Their attempts to apply economic pressure on

third-party states that were believed to be aiding Israel against the
Arabs failed.

The 1967 oil embargo in particular failed for a number

of reasons, among which were the following:
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1. The U.S., the main target of the Arab oil weapon was immune to the Arab embargo because it was at that time to tally self-sufficient in terms of western hemisphere oil
supplies.
2. The international oil companies did a great job making up
the shortfall in Arab oil supplies to the embargoed countries, from other sources despite the closure of the Suez
Canal. In this case, the focus of the world oil supply shifted
somewhat from the availability of crude oil at the sour ce to
the tight situation as regards transportation.
3 . No quota ceilings were imposed on production, with the result that no actual physical shortage of oil was created.
4. There was no uniform interp retation of the coverage of the
embargo; some of the North African oil countries did not
in fact withhold supplies from West Germany. 55
However, many important changes took place within the oil industry between 1967 and 1973.

Many of these changes occurred be-

tween the oil companies and the host governments, which have been
discussed in earlier chapters of this paper.
The first serious initiative for the employment of oil as a political weapon came from Saudi Arabia.
used successfully.

This time the oil weapon was

In principle, Saudi Arabia decided to take this ini-

tiative as early as April of 1973.

King Faisal sent his oil ministers,

Mr. Ahmad Zaki Yamani to Washington in April of 1973 with a message
to the effect that "Saudi Arabia will not significantly expand its present
oil production unless Washington changes its pro-Israeli s tance in the
Middle East. 11 56 King Faisal reiterated this warning in various statements he made to the press and the most significant was in an interview with Newsweek, published in the September 10, 1973 issue.
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During this interview, the King emphasized that Saudi Arabia would not
increase its oil production beyond the limits that can be absorbed by
its economy, unless two conditions were satisfied:
First, the U. S, and the west must effectively assist the kingdom
of Saudi Arabia in industrializing itself in order to create an
alternative source of income to oil, the depletion of which we
shall be accelerating by increasing production--and also so
that we can absorb the excess income (see Table 6) resulting
from production at such a level. Secondly, the suitable political atmosphere, hitherto disturbed by the Middle East crisis and Zionist expansionist ambitions, must be present. 5 7
However, when Newsweek published this interview, there was
no precise indication as to whether Saudi Arabia would take any steps
if its conditions were not met.

There were hints that even if Saudi

Arabia decided to take steps, it would not do so immediately.
give time to the parties concerned to respond to its conditions.

It would
The

outbreak of the October war and the vast military aid Israel received
from the U.S. obviously necessitated an earlier implementation of the
Saudi plans for cutbacks in oil production.

This move made by Saudi

Arabia helped to influence other Arab nati ons to follow, in using oil as
a political weapon against the U.S. and the west.

The Saudi Policy During the Boycott Crisis
The embargo provision discussed in Kuwait was only a recommendation, however the Arab oil-producing countries later adopted it
as a stated collective policy.

As indicated earlier, the initiative to do

so was taken up first by Saudi Arabia.

On October 19 and 20, 1973,

TABLE 6
MONETARY RESERVES, MIDDLE EAST OIL-EXPORTING COUNTRIEs::c
(in millions of dollars)

Country
Algeria
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait
Libya
Saudi Arabia
Syria

$410
145
310
476
182
918
607
59

1971

1970

1969

339
167
208
462
203
' 1,590
662
55

$

$

507
161
621
600
288
2;665
1,444
88

1972

1973

L974

493
149
960
782
363
2,925
2,500
135

$1, l 43
391
1,237
l, 553

$ 1,689
342
8,383
3,273
l, 297
3,616
14,285
835

$

501

2, 127
3,877
481

1975

1976

$ 1,353

$ l, 987

294
8,897
2,727
1, 655
2, 195
23,319
735

339
8,833
4,601
l, 929
3,206
27,025
36 l

*A country's international reserves consist of its reserved in gold, SDRs (special drawing rights
which are unconditional international reserve assets created by the International Monetary Fund),
its reserve position in the Fund (unconditional assets that arise from a country's gold subscription to the Fund and from the Fund's use of a member's currency to finance the drawings of others)
and its foreign exchange (holdings by monetary authorities--such as central banks, currency
boards, exchange stabilization funds and Treasuries --of claims on foreigners in the form of bank
deposits, Treasury bills, government securities and other claims usable in the event of a balance
of payments deficit).
SOURCE: Data from the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics,
June, 1975, August 1977.
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the Saudi government issued two proclamations stating a whole range
of restrictive measures that included both general cutbacks and an
export embargo to specific countries, including the United States.
Cutbacks were decreed at 10 percent of the September production
level, instead of the required 5 percent agreed upon at the Kuwait
meeting, with anticipated further monthly reductions.

Numerous

friendly countries, such as Britain and France, were exempted from
cutbacks.

Othe r Arab countries immediately followed Saudi Arabia's

example, and within a few days, the Netherlands was also subjected
to the embargo.
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As indicated earlier, the United States was placed

under an embargo because it was supplying arms to Israel on a large
scale.

The Netherlands was included in the hostile group for several

reasons, including their offer to replace Austria as a relay centre for
emigrating Jews (Soviet), ~everal pro-Israeli statements by Dutch ·
leaders, recruitment on Dutch territory- -with permission from the
authorities- -of volunteers for service in Israel, and the use of the
official Dutch airline KLM, for chartered flights to Israel, in connection with the Israeli war effort. 59 The embargoes against the United
States and the Netherlands applied to both direct arid indirect exports,
i.e., to those initially shipped to third countries in which oil was processed or transshipped for final American and Dutch ports, and for
supplies to the United States Navy.

The Saudi embargo also included

a thir.d category of countries like Trinidad, the Bahamas, the Dutch
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Antilles, Canada, Puerto Rico, Guam, Singapore, and Bahrein (whose
refinery was processing 50,000 barrels a day for the United States
Navy).

Also, some European refineries in Italy, Greece and France

that supplied the American markets or Navy were subjected to full or
partial embargo. 60
The Saudi decree thus set a pattern for collective Arab action.
However, the effects of the boycott policy varied for each producing
country.

The Arab countries that once shipped large volumes to the

United States and the Netherlands saw a large decrease in their exports, unlike those that supplied the non-embargoes markets.

There

was no uniform method adopted as to whether the embargo and cut backs should be handled incrementally or not, that is, whether the
decreed cutbacks should be applied prior to or after deducting the
embargoes volumes.

Saudi Arabia applied the incremental method,

with the result that the Saudi Arabian exports fell by 36 percent, an
amount the Saudis themselves found slightly disturbing. 61

This situ-

ation largely contributed to the calling of the second conference of
Arab oil ministers held in Kuwait on November 4, 1973 .

The deci-

sions of the conference can be summed up under four points:
1. The November production was to be reduced uniformly by
25 percent from the September level, with a further 5 percent planned for December.
2. This uniform cutback was to include the embargoes to the
United States and the Netherlands (a non-incremental
method), which meant that, for other consumers, reduction in supplies would be less than 25 percent.
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3. Consumer contries were to be warned that a more positive
attitude toward the Arab cause would have to be taken before they could qualify for the exempted category.
4. Saudi Arabia's Yamani and Algeria's Abdel Salam Belaid
were to tour major consumer countries to explain these
Arab restrictive measures.
The European countries responded promptly to the November
4th, Kuwait announcement.

At a meeting in Brussels on November 6,

the European Economic Community {EEC) published a declaration
urging all parties directly involved in the Arab-Israeli war to withdraw
to the positions occupied on October 22, 1973 (i . e., the original United
Nations sponsored cease - fire line), and called for a peaceful settlement, which would conform to the Security Council Resolution 242, of
November 22, 1967. 62 The Arabs saw the EEC ' s statement as a point
scored by collective Arab diplomacy, and as such it brought great
satisfaction to the Arab leaders.

Encouraged by the EEC move, the

Arab governments further sought another EEC statement insisting on
Israeli troop withdrawal from all occupied territories in 1967.

How-

ever, the EEC as an organized body refused to issue such a statement .
So the two Arab ministers, Yamani of Saudi Arabia and Belaid of Algeria, sought such a declaration from indivicual EEC member countries .

The countries that agreed to do so were reclassified into the

exempt category.
The two meetings held in Kuwait set the basic pattern and
guidelines to be followed in implementing the oil embargo.

What
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followed was, on the one hand, an elaboration of the initial broad principles into a more detailed set of measures and, on the other hand, a
series of adjustments on the part of the Arab governments in response
to the changing attitudes of consumers.

This modification of the Arab

oil boycott policy was achieved at the Arab oil ministers meetings in
Vienna on November 18, 1973, in Kuwait on December 8-9, and again
on December 24-25, and finally at the Arab summit meeting in Algiers
on January 2 6-2 8, 1974. 63
The Algiers summit meeting saw the adoption of several new
resolutions.

The most significant of these resolutions was the one

tha_t decreed severance of all diplomatic and economic relations- -including exports of oil, with Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia. 64
A detailed policy guideline to this effect was set after several meetings
were held by the Arab oil ministers,

By the end of December, 1973,

the oil consuming nations were divided into four categories as follows:

l. The most favoured countries, i.e. those entitled not merely
to the September level of supplies but actually to as much
as their ovvn requirements dictated. Among these were
Britain, France, and Spain among the European states,
Arab importing countries, African states that had broken
off diplomatic relations with Israel, and Islamic countries.
2. Friendly countries, i.e. those that modified their policies
in favour of the Arab cause. To this category belonged
those countries previously in the neutral group which, due
to the change of their attitudes toward the Arab cause, became eligible for supplies at the September level (for example) Belgium and Japan.
3. Neutral countries: Those to which general export cutbacks
applied. Because of their pro-Arab statements of November
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6, the EEC countries (with the exception of the Netherlands)
were temporarily placed in a more favoured position within
this category inasmuch as they were exempted from further
5 percent general cutbacks promised for December. Later,
after individual EEC governments--following Yamani ' s and
Bela id's visits --gave additional assurances to the Arabs,
they became qualified to be treated as friendly.
4. Hostile countries to which full embargo applied. These included the United States, the Netherlands, and as mentioned
earlier, Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia. 65
The Arab producers were at the initial stage committed to consecutive cutbacks of 5 percent per month, in addition to the basic 25
percent decreed at the second Kuwait meeting.

At such a rate, these

progressive reductions could in due course bring production to zero,
which those producers with smaller financial reserves could not afford,
even temporarily.

So to try and co rrect the situation, a secret reso-

lution at the Algiers summit meeting decreed that successive cutbacks
would only be applied to the point point at which the reduction of a producer's revenue reached the maximum of 25 percent of its income for
1972.
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An estimate was made indicating that due to the 70 percent

price increase as compared with 1972, the Arab producers could afford to decrease their output to approximately 45· percent of the 1972
production level on the average, before their revenue would fall to 75
percent of the 1972 revenue level.

Embargo Lifted
In response t o then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's
reference to possible American couriter ...measures, Yamani declared

TABLE 7
ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES' REVENUES
( 1960-1980)
(in millions of dollars)

Country

Saudi Arabia
Kuwait
Abu Dhabi
Qatar
Iraq
Iran
Algeria
Libya
Nigeria
Indonesia
Venezuela
TOTAL

1960

1965

1970

1971

1972

1973

1974

$ 2, 101
l, 439

$ 4,915
2, 130
l, 035

185
840
1, 934
440
1, 846
883
284
l, 7 51

$ 2,988
l, 600
538
247
802
2,423
680
1,705
1,200
480
1,933

3,885
1, 095
2,210
1,950
830
2,800

$19,400
7,945
4,800
l, 425
5,900
14, 930
3,700
7,990
6,960
2, 150
10, 010

$12, 120

$14,515

$22,675

$85,210

(3)
877

1, 135

$1,200
895
233
122
521
l, 093
381
1,295
410
185
1, 104

$2,303

$3,831

$7,742

$

355
465
(2)
54
266
285
(3)
(2)
(3)

$

655
671
33
69
375
522
(3)
371
(3)
( 3)

418

360
l, 465

(continued on next page)
SOURCES: 196 0 .. 1910, Petroleum Information Foundation; 1970-71 Petroleum Economics Ltd. ,
Printed in the Congressional Record, Ma r~h 7, 19 74.

TABLE 7 (continued)
1975 (4 )

1980( 4 )

Country

ILow

Medi um

Highl

!Low

Medium

High

Saudi Arabia
Kuwait
Abu Dhabi
Qatar
Iraq
Iran
Algeria
Libya
Nigeria
Indonesia
Venezuela

$22, 150
8,450
6,400
l, 600
7,300
16,600
4,100
9,750
8,250
2, 100
10,200

$22,850
8,700
6,550
1,650
7, 550
17, l 00
4,250
10,050
8,500
2,200
10,550

$ 23,500
9,000
6,750
1, 700
7,750
l 7,600
4,350
10,400
8,700
2,300
10,850

$ 36,300

$ 43,450

$ 50,550

10,250
12,400
2,400
13,650
25,650
4,750
10,550
11, 350
2,400
12, 100

12,250
14,750
2,900
16,750
30,70 0
5,750
12,850
14,250
2,950
14,500

14,300
17, 150
3,350
19,800
35 ,750
6,700
15, 100
l 7, 100
3,500
16, 900

$96,900

$99,950

$102,900

$141,800

$171,100

$200,200

TOTAL
( l)
(2)
{3)
( 4)

I

In November 1973 Ecuador became a member of OPEC, and Bagon an associate member; they
are not included in the above chart.
Libya and Abu Dhabi started production in 1961 and 1962 respectively.
Not available.
Three estimates: Low-Medium-High.
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in Copenhagen on November 22. 1973 that any military intervention
would simply makd the Arabs destroy their oil facilities. 67 Under the
leadership o f Saudi Arabia, the Arab oil producers in early December
began to exhibit signs indicating their intention to relax their conditions.

Most observers attribute this move to Yamani's visit on De-

cember 5th to the United States.

It was believed that Yamani saw that

the United States was playing an active role as a mediator in the ArabIs.raeli conflict.

On December 9, the Arab oil ministers, again under

Saudi Arabian leadership, agreed to tie the lifting of the embargo to
the adoption of a timetable for Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab
territories, including Jerusalem .

Again on December 2 5, the minis-

ters agreed to reduce the 25 percent production cutback to 15 percent,
and cancel the 5 percent reduction scheduled for January. 68 Also encouraged by the Washington sponsored Egyptian-Israeli disengagement
agreement on January 17, 1974, President Sadat began pressing for an
early end of the oil embargo.

Sadat I s proposal met with some diffi-

culties from President Assad of Syria, Boumediene of Algeria and
King Faisal of Saudi Arabia.

These Arab beads of state opposed the

proposal simply because the terms of the Egyptian-ls raeli disengagement agreement fell short of the Arab conditions formulated in December, i.e. a timetable for full Israeli withdrawal.

The protest of Sadat's

action was also echoed by Libya's Colonel al-Qadhafi.

He even went to

the extent of boycotting certain joint meetings of the heads of state.
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Finally, on March 18, the Arab oil ministers during a meeting
in Vienna, agreed, over Syria's and Libya's negative votes to temporarily lift the embargo against the United States until June 1, 1974.
The conclusion on May 29, 1974 of the Syrian-Israeli disengagement
agreement paved the way for two final acts in the embargo drama: On
June 3, 1974 in Cairo, the ministers tentatively agreed to remove all
restrictions except for the embargo on the Netherlands, and on July
11, 1974, this decision became formal, and the ban on the Netherlands
was lifted as well.

The boycott crisis came to an end, nevertheless,

in their June and July statements, the ministers warned that embargoes
could be reimposed if a new war broke out.

\.
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CHAPTER V

ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES

The post-embargo period has witnessed serious attempts by
major oil consuming nations to lessen their dependence on foreign
energy sources- -particularly oil.
United States.

This is striking! y true for the

I chose the United States because it was the main tar-

get of the 1973 oil embargo.

Also, it is one of the large st energy

consuming nations in the world.

The Carter administration has given

energy efficiency a high priority, and to illustrate this, he has created
a new energy department.
The oil producing nations are also concerned about their oil.
They are aware of the fact that it cannot last forever, so they must
conserve .

The Quest for Energy Security
In the Summer of 1972, a top United States Department of
State official, John Irwin, held a personal conference with the various
agency heads responsible for energy matters.

He warned them that

the U.S. was increasing its dependence on foreign energy supplies-mainly oil.

He concluded that this could hamper the United States 1
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freedom to conduct its foreign policy.

This is the first time that energy

receiv ed a high level of attention from the U.S. foreign policy machinery.

Nothing spectacular came of his efforts at the time, though some

shared his concern.

A lack of cohesive energy policy continued to

exist, thus expanding dependence on foreign oil, principally Middle
Eastern oil; until at least the 1980s.

It was not until September 1973,

when President Nixon indicated in a speech that the United States cannot be at the mercy of the Middle Eastern oil producers, that formal
recognition that the security of U.S. energy was in jeopardy, finally
reached the top level of fo reign policy. 69 When the Arabs imposed
the oil boycott on the U .S., short-term crisis measures were adopted,
but not seriously enforced.
President Nixon, again in a speech on November 7, 1973 , advocated what he termed " project independence" in energy.

A few

weeks later, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission gave the
president a $10 billion, five-year plan for an energy research and development budget that outlined measures for moving to self-sufficiency
by 1980-85. Again in an energy related mes sage to Congress on January 23 , and in his State of the Union add ress on January 30, 1974,
President Nixon outlines a program for energy self-sufficiency, adding
that, since 1970 was a year of the environment, 1974 should be the
year of energy. 70
On February 11, 1974, a high-level conference of the major
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energy-deficient consuming states was held in Washington, at the invitation of President Nixon.

Various aspects relating to energy were

discussed, and a possible remedial measure, among others, agreed
upon was, sharing knowledge in the area of energy conservation and
research and development.

So energy finally became a highly regarded

international issue.
President Nixon's project independence was
complish three major tasks, according to him.

supposed to ac-

They were: To rapid-

ly increase domestic energy supplies, reduce demand by conserving
energy, and finally to develop new technologies through massive new
research and development programs.

Several people were skeptical

about the success of project independence, considering its aims and
the time frame given for the realization of these aims.

However, it

was an important thing, since for the first time, the nation was alerted
to the hazard facing the security of its energy and was beginning, or
at least attempting to do something about it.
The post - embargo period did not improve too much for project
independence and several of the recommendations that accompanied it.
The United States could not adjust domestic energy policies to accord

with the newly sensed foreign energy realities.

Prior to the oil em-

bargo, the United States was skeptical of the existence of any energy
related problems.

When it became clear that such a problem did exist

after all, the only clear cut solution was to serach for scapegoats.
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This attitude continued through the embargo period.

The Carter ad-

ministration is finally trying to settle down to deal seriously with the
problem.

He has so far brought the various energy related agencies

together under one newly created cabinet level department,

This is

indeed a giant step in the right direction.
The focus of world attention in international energy trade has
been on oil.

There is, however, a significant amount of trade in

electricity, coal, and natural gas as well.

As the Arabs are finding

out , prospects for more nuclear power plants also seem bright, which
could be translated into less dependence on oil.
power plants are a sensitive commodity.

At present, nuclear

One major concern is that

nuclear fuel could be diverted to weapons by terrorist or various extremist groups,

Nuclear power plants nonetheless might have a bright

future (see Table 8), and will be in significant international demand,
both because of the high price and possible scarcity of other energy
sources, and because of the eventual warning of the world's fossil
fuel supply.

Some of the Middle East oil producing countries, includ-

ing Saudi Arabia have suggested that oil and gas be conserved for such
long-term use as petro-chemicals, and that the w o rld should turn
quickly to less exhaustible energy sources, such as nuclear power. 71
The United States exports coal, mainly to Europe, Japan and
Canada, and in turn imports natural gas (over 4 % of U.S. consumption
comes from Canada).

\

The Canadians however, for the sake of conser-
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vation, have limited both gas and oil exports.

TABLE 8
WESTERN EUROPE:
Country
Austria
Belgium
Finland
Francd
West Germany
Great Britain
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
Total

F ORECAST O F NUCLEAR CAPACITY (10 6 kw)
1975

1. 5

o. 5

3.0
6.9
12.6

1980

1. 2
3. S
1. 7
6.2
25. 8
29. 0
1. 0

2000

8. 0
2. 7
0. 5

2.4
6. 0
3.7
18.3
51. 0
49. 0
2.5
o. 5
24.0
3.0
1. 6
1. 5
14.0
14.0
4.3
2.0

9.2
14. 7
16. 5
80.0
175. 0
208.0
18. 0
4.0
140.0
40.0
22.0
5.0
69.0
42.5
13. 5
11. 0

95.3

198.3

868.4

1. 4
0. 5

8.0
1. l
0. 6
0. 5

1. 0
3. 3
1. 0

s. 5

31. 7

1985

SOURCE: Stanford Research Institute - IP 71

Beginning in the early 1970s, both industry and government
seriously considered the idea of importing liquid natural gas (LNG).
This idea was first put into practice when Algeria imported some LNG
to New England.
land.

However, the LNG projects are costly in capital and

There are some proposals for LNG from Siberia, which has

large gas reserved, for the east and west coast.

Launching a massive

LNG import program will definitely impair energy security and foreign

69
dependence that the U.S. is now trying to curb.
to conserve its gas.

The U.S. must learn

It is estimated that 60 percent of gas is burned

wastefully under industrial boilers.

The U.S. must also attempt to

conserve energy by switching to other fuels, by increasing production
of, for example, offshore discoveries, and Rocky Mountain gas with
nuclear or other stimulation, and by coal gasification.

Gas require-

ments pose almost the same problems as oil, except that gas lacks
some of the energy-insecurity temptation of oil, because it has been
more difficult to import from overseas. 72

TABLE 9
ENERGY DEMAND AND COMPOSITION OF
PRIMARY ENERGY IN 2000 (%)
No.
Case
No.
No.
No.
No.

l
2
3
4

(1970)
(1971)
(1968)
(1971)

Total
10 tns
25
25
30
36-39

Petroleum
32
59
26
55

Coal

Gas

Hydro

Nuclear

20

16

4

28

24
11

23
30

5
4

22

SOURCE: Stanford Research Institute - IP 71

A U.S. "energy gap 11 will continue to exist for at least a while.
This gap will have to be filled by imports and /or drastic measures,
such as allocations and rationing.

The interpenetration of domestic

energy programs--those that increase or expand domestic production
and those that decrease demand- -and of foreign affairs--both policies
and substantial import programs --should clearly be apparent.

The
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TABLE 10
URANIUM RESERVES AND REQUIREMENTS

Requirements through 1985
United States
Japan
United Kingdom
West Germany
France
W. Europe Other
Foreign Other
Total

Reserves - -$10 / LBU 3 08

Thousands of
tons U308
474
106

47
10

92
65

9

40
10 7

4
11

116
1. 000

12
-100

Thousands of
tons U 308

%

7

330
300

29
26

236
124
92
68

20
11

1, 15 0

100

United States
South and Southwest Africa
Canada
France, Gabon, Niger
Australia
Others
Total

o/c

8
6

SOURCE: Stanford Research Institute - IP 71

TABLE 11
FORECAST OF NUCLEAR POWER CAPACITY UP TO 2000 (l0 6 kw)
End of year

1980
1985
1990
2000

USA

132
280
508
1, 200
(37)

Other

141
303

578
1, 460
(44)

Communist
Bloc

20
56
146
600
( 19)

Total
293
639

l, 2 32
3,260
(100)

SOURCE: U.S. Atomic Energy Commission - Nuclear Power
1943-200-WASH-l 13p.
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more the U.S. produces and conserves, the less it will be dependent
on insecure foreign sources of supply, and hence the less subject to
"political coercion II and balance - of- trade problems.
There is no doubt that energy will reamin for quite a while as
the pr i mary component of the international economic scene , and will
greatly influence other areas of foreign policy, fo r both producer and
consumer nations.

The oil - producing nations presently do not have a

need for nuclear weapons, o r even powerful in gaining international
recognition.
fact.

Today , oil is power.

We must live with and accept this

The post - World War II focus was on the Cold War and Commu-

nism; a threat that decreased just in time for the United States to be
replaced by a more important and acute concern, in both domestic and

foreign policy, over the l ong-term energy problem.
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MAP 2

The Nuclear Power Grid
(States sized according to their populations)

THE NUCLEAR POWER GRID
(states sized according to their population)

S OURCE:

Cited in Newsweek, December 10, 1973.
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUS IONS

The motivation underlying the use of Arab oil as a political
weapon is a faiTly direct one.

It stems from the mounting Arab des-

peration a t the failure of the world community to ensure the implementati on of UN Security Council Resolution 242 of Nove mber 22 , 1967,
which stated , among other things, that Israel withdraw from Arab
terriroty occupied in the 196 7 war, that the political independence of
every state in the area be re cognized and that a settlement of the
Palestinian question be made.

Six years had passed since the 1967

war with no firm action being taken by the world community to enforce
this resolution.

Nothing seemed capable of stopping the continuous

erosion of Arab rights which had been going on since the creation of
the State of Israel.
Meanwhile, Arab oil continued to contribute to the development
of the non -Arab world.

But somehow, it seemed incapable of restor-

ing the p olitical rights of several million Arabs who are presently
stateless, or aid those Arab countries which had lost sizeable parts
of thei r territory, to regain them.

This contradiction continued to

worry the Arab conscience until Arab patience finally ran out, and
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war broke out for the fourth time in a quarter of a century.

At this

stage, Arab oil was brought in to ensure that another war had not been
fought in vain .

It is an attempt to spread the effects of the conflict as

widely as possible, in order to provide countries importing Arab oil
with a stake in the future stability of the Middle East, and to persuade
them to safeguard their stake, by applying maximum pressure on the
party that holds the key to a solution of the problem,

This, of course,

is the United States which, by virtue of its role as the major supporter
and protector of Israel, is in a position to persuade the Israelis to act
with reason.

The Arab oil embargo therefore was aimed at bringing

pressure on the U. S , in two ways:

Firstly, from within, by denying

the U.S. the amounts of Arab oil which it needs to meet its growing
demand at home.

This might force the U, S. government to try and

work genuinely for peace in the Middle East.

Secondly, from without,

by denying Japan, the European Economic Community and other countries of the world, varying proportions of their requirements of Arab
oil in the hope that the governments of these nations will, as a matter
of self-interest, bring maximum pressure to bear on the U.S. , in
order to stabilize the Middle East situation.
Oil will remain the crucial source of energy in the near future,
that is within the next two decades.

During th.is period, the United

States and Saudi Arabia will dominate the world energy scene.

The

United States will still remain the largest consumer of oil, even if
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the principles laid down in "project independence" are adherred to;
Saudi Arabia will most likely remain the largest producer of oil simply becaus e it holds the largest known oil reserves.

The hard strug-

gle toward energy self-sufficiency in the United States through conservation, exploration and various other means might reduce America I s
dependence on imported oil, within the time frame heretofore indicated.
However, should another Arab-Israeli war take place in the near future, the Arabs will definitely use the oil weapon.

The western indus -

trialized nations as well as developing nations cannot afford such an
economic blow.
When oil ceases to be an important source of energy, either
b ecause it has been exhausted or because of alternative energy sources
have been found , the Arabs still can use their financial weapon if it
becomes necessary to do so in the years ahead.

They can put their

financial weapon into action by withdrawing their petro-dollar s from
the Ame rican, British and other European banks.

This could cause

wide-spread financial chaos, that the western industrialized nations
know can prove very detrimental to them.

So the Arab oil producing

nations and Saudi Arabia in particular will continue to be influential
in inte r national relations.

Saudi Arabia w ill continue to play an influ-

ential role within the Arab and muslim world.

They will continue to

support t h e Palestinian cause to maintain their influential status.
The oil weapon alone might not settle the Arab-Israeli dispute,
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however it will serve whenever applied, to put pressure on those that
can influence the outcome of the Arab-Israeli dispute--particularly
the United States.

This is very significant.

Arab oil was for several years kept away from politics and the
Arab-Israeli conflict.

The late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, who was

well-inown to be an avowed enemy of two institutions-- Zionism and
Communism--was very reluctant to use the oil weapon against the
United States.

However he was provoked into doing so to a large de-

gree because of the lar ge volume of U.S. arms aid to Israel during
the October, 1973 war.
This thesis predicts that the present Saudi leadership will be
forced to use the oil weapon again if it becomes necessary.

Israel is

aware of this, the United States and other industrialized nations are
also aware of this, as well as the non-oil producing nations (developing ).

The Saudi leadership knows that their participation is crucial

to the success of an oil embargo.

Their will to support the Palestin-

ian cause will overshadow many differences they might encounter
whenever they participate in an oil embargo.
In short, Saudi Arabia has grown from a poor and backward
desert kingdom to a prosperous financial super-power.

The kingdom

may never become a military super-power, however it is in a position
today to make the military super-powers listen when it speaks.
is power in itself.

This power is derived from oil.

This

Saudi Arabia's
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population is small compared to the size of the kingdom.
is enjoying rapid development.

The kingdom

Through its oil and financial power,

Saudi Arabia has managed on behalf of the Arabs and Islam in particular to isolate Israel and Zionism from the world community.
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APPENDIX A
STATISTICAL TABLES

TABLE l2
OIL EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES,
JANUARY-AUGUST, 1974

Exporting Country
Canada
Nigeria
Iran
Venezuela
Saudi Arabia
Indonesia
Algeria
E cuador
Trinidad
United Arab E mirates
Angola
Others
Total

Thousands
of Barrels

Percent of
U.S. Imports

896.4
633.8

24.7
1 7. 5
15. 5
11. 2
8. 3

561. 9
405. 1
301. 0
283.7
195.7

7.8

47.3
8 0. l

5. 4
2.2
2.2
1. 7
1. 3
2.2

3,624.9

l 00. 0

78.7
78. 6
62.6

SOURCE: Federal Energy Administration figures in the Washington Post, October 24, l 974.
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TABLE 13
OIL CONSUMPTION, PRODUCTION AND NET TRADE,
BY MAJOR WORLD REGIONS, 1972
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Africa, South
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Japan
Oceania
USSR, Eastern
Europe, China

15,980
1, 665
1, 195

ll, 180
1,835
3,650

4,515

2,-105
14,205
1, 145
370
200

1,325
435
17,975
3,745
2,085

770
13,735

975
l, 430
4,800
635

86
1,295
143
306

880
125
4, 765
300

7,990

8,865
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52,695

52,925
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0
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2,450

9.3
67. 1

16,830
3,375
1,885

93.6
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SOURCE: The Petroleum Economist, March, 1974.
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TABLE 14
ESTUvfATED OIL EXPORTS AND REVENUES OF
MAJOR OP EC COUNT RIES

millions of U. S, dollars

A. Government Oil Revenues
Saudi Arabia
Kuwait
Iran
Iraq
United Arab
Emirates
Qatar
Libya
Algeria
Nigeria
Venezuela
Indonesia

1,200
895
1, 136
521

2, 149
1,400
l, 944
840

3, 107
l, 657
2,380
575

5, 100
1, 900
4, 100
1,500

20,000
7,000
17,400
6,800

233
122
1,295
325
411
l, 406
185

431
198
1,766
350
915
1, 702
284

551
255
1,598
700
1, 174
1,948
429

900
400
2,300
900
2,000
2,800
900

4,100
1,600
7,600
3,700
7,000
l O, 6 00
3,000

7,729

11, 9 79

14,374

22,800

88,800

millions of barrels

B. Oil Exports
Saudi Arabia
Kuwait
Iran
Iraq
United Arab
Emirates
Qatar
Libya
Algeria
Nigeria
Venezuela
Indonesia

c.

1,359
1,082
1,318
545

1, 707
1, 169
1,562
594

2, 163
1, 176
1,752
382

2,850
1,078
2,037
705

3,060
905
2,072
670

253
133
1, 188
358
376
1, 288
265

339
156
989
276
531
l, 206
273

384
176
813
373
628
1, 133
345

555
208
794
382
715
1, 170
426

614
189
547
350
785
998
460

8, 165

8,802

9,325

l 0, 92 0

10,650

Government Oil Revenues
2er barrel of exports

Saudi Arabia
Kuwait
Iran

• 883
• 828
• 862

u. s.
1. 259
l. 197

1. 246

l. 437
l. 409
l. 358

dollars

l. 789
1. 763
2,023

6.535
7.734
8,397
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TABLE 14- -Continued
Iraq
United Arab E.
Emirates
Qatar
Libya
Algeria
Nigeria
Venezuela
Indonesia
Average per
Barrel Revenues
All Countries

• 957

1. 415

l. 507

2. 127

10. 149

.920
• 915
1. 090
.907
1. 093
l. 092
.698

1. 272
1. 264
1. 786
l. 268
1,722
1. 411
1. 040

1. 434
1. 445
l. 966
l. 877
1,870
1. 719
1. 243

1. 621
l. 923
2,896
2.356
2,797
2.393
2. 112

6.677
8.465
13,893
10,571
8.917
1 o. 621
6.521

• 946

1.360

1. 541

2.087

8. 338

SOURCE: The Petroleum Economist, March, 1974.
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TABLE 15
SUPPLY OF CRUDE OIL FROM ARAB AND NON-ARAB SOURCES
TO SELECTED OECD COUNTRIES BY THE FIVE U.S. MAJORS,
EMBARGO PERIOD COMPARED WITH BASE PERIOD
(thousands of barrels daily unless otherwise noted)
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Total
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455
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Total
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0
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Total
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TABLE 16
U.S. IMPORTS OF CRUDE OIL BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN,
BASE PERIOD COMPARED WITH AUGUST-SEPTEMBER
1973 AND JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1974
(thousands of barrels daily unless
otherwise noted)

Country
of
Origin

Total
Total,
Arab States

Base
Period
(Dec.
1972
through
March
1973)

Jan. Feb.,
1974

(l)

(2 )

(3)

Absolute

Per Cent

3, 190

4, 114

2,885

-1,229

- 30

730

1, 2 03

19

-1, 184

-98

2,911
633
1,082
524
229
237

2,886
493
960
462
230
275

45
140
122
62
201
38

-22
-11
-12
88
16

206

246

40

19

Total,
Non-Arab States 2,460
Venezuela
516
1, 116
Canada
334
Nigeria
113
Iran
126
Indonesia
All other
Non-Arab
206
SOURCE:

Aug. Sept.
1973

Difference
Between
Columns
2 and 3

U.S. Department of Commerce, April 8, 1974.
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APPENDIX B
(MAPS)

MAP 3
-

-.

-·; --.-

The Worldwide Search for 011

MIDEAST AND NORTH AFRICA hold more
than 70 per cent of free world's reserves of oil,
but now the search is on in every comer of the
globe lo find new and more secure sources.

Source: U.S. News & World Report, December 30, 1974.
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APPENDIX C
CHRONOLOGY OF THE OIL CRISIS
Date

Location

Event

1973
Sept. 1

Tripoli

Libya nationalizes 51 percent of the interests of Esso Libya/Sirte, Mobil, Shell,
Gelsenberg, Texaco, Standard Oil of California, Libyan-American (Atlantic Richfield), and Grace.

Sept. 5-9

Algiers

Conference of less-developed countries
approves forming "producers I associations, 11 calls for withdrawal of Israeli
forces from occupied Arab lands.

Sept. 15- 16

Vienna

35th OPEC conference designates Abu
Dhabi, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatair, and
Saudi Arabia (the Gulf Six) to negotiate collectively with the companies over prices.
Other OPEC members to negotiate individually.

Oct. 6

Sinai and
Golan

Beginning of the Arab-Israeli War.

Oct. 7

Baghdad

Iraq nationalizes the holdings of Exxon and
Mobil in the Basrah Petroleum Company,
corresponding to 23, 75 percent equity in
the company.

Oct. 8- l 0

Vienna

· OPEC ministerial committee of the Gulf
Six meets with oil companies' representatives to discuss revision of the 1971 Teheran
agreement and oil prices. Negotiations fail.

Oct. 16

Kuwait

The Gulf Six unilaterally raise the posted
price of Saudi market crude from $3. 011 to
$5. 119 per barrel.
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Date

Location

Event

Oct. 17

Kuwait

Arab oil ministers agree on the use of oil
weapon in the Arab-Israeli conflict, a mandatory cut in exports, and a recommended
embargo against unfriendly states.

Oct. 19-20

Riyadh
et. a 1.

Saudi Arabia and other Arab states proclaim an embargo on oil exports to the
United States
Oil embargo extended to the Netherlands by
Arab States .

Oct. 23 - 28

Nov. 4-5

Kuwait

Arab oil ministers agree to cut production
by 25 percent of the September level, the
cutback to include volumes embargoes to
the unfriendly states; Arab oil policy to be
explained in consumer countries by special
emissaries.

Nov. 18

Vienna

Arab oil ministers cancel the scheduled 5
percent cut in production for EEC.

Nov. 19-20

Vienna

OPEC's 36th conference endorses decisions
for the Gulf Six.

Nov. 23

Algiers

Arab summit conference adopts open and
secret resolutions on the use of the oil
weapon. Embargo extended to Portugal,
Rhodesia, and South Africa.

Dec. 9

Kuwait

Arab oil ministers announce a further production cut of 5 percent for January; friendly c o untries exe mpted.

Dec, 22-24

Teheran

OPEC ministerial committee of the Gulf Six
decides to raise posted price of marker ·.
crude to $ 1 1. 651 per barrel effective January l, 1974.

Dec. 24-25

Kuwait

Arab oil ministers cancel the 5 percent production cut scheduled for January and agree
on a change in the production cut from 25 to
15 percent of the September level.

......... . .

_,•
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Date

Location

1974
Feb. 12-14

Algiers

Heads of state of Algeria, Egypt, Syria,
and Saudi Arabia discuss oil strategy in
view of the progress in Arab-Israeli disengagement.

March 13

Tripoli

Arab oil ministers agree to end the embargo
against the United States and to restore production to pre-Octob er levels. Formal an nouncement to be postponed.

March 17

Vienna

Arab oil ministers announce end of the embargo against the United States.

June 1-3

Cairo

Arab oil ministers decide to end most restrictions on exports of oil , but continue
embargo against the Netherlands, Portugal ,
South Africa and Rhodesia.

July 10-11

Cairo

Arab oil ministers lift the embargo against
the Netherlands.

SOURCE:

Event

Daedalus, Fall 1975.
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